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In April of 2005, a group of scientists, scholars, policymakers, and legal 
professionals gathered at Duke Law School to discuss the implications of 
attempts to introduce behavioral biology evidence into the criminal justice 
system.  The conference, entitled “The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the 
Criminal Law,” was sponsored by Law and Contemporary Problems; the 
Institute for Genome Science and Policy’s Center for Genome Ethics, Law, and 
Policy; and the Science and Technology Law Section of the American Bar 
Association.  The articles published in this symposium reflect the presentations 
and commentary from that conference and demonstrate the multidisciplinary 
nature of the issues that arise from introducing behavioral genetics evidence 
into criminal proceedings. 
The first two articles of the volume serve as a primer on the meaning of 
behavioral genetics, an introduction to recent scientific strides in the field and 
to its limitations in explaining the causes of human behavior.  In the first article, 
Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial Behavior, scientists Laura A. 
Baker, Serena Bezdjian, and Adrian Raine discuss the methodologies and 
results of behavioral genetics studies focusing on such traits as antisocial 
behavior, aggression, and behaviors associated with criminal conduct.1  Their 
article describes in detail the classic methods as well as more recent research 
designs of behavioral genetics studies, along with the various assumptions, 
strengths, and weaknesses of each approach.  It discusses the leading scientific 
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research in behavioral genetics that addresses the genetic and social risk factors 
contributing to antisocial personality disorder.  The article further shows that 
behavior arises from a complex interaction between genetic and environmental 
factors, dispelling the notion of behavioral genetics as a study of genetic 
determinism.  Finally, the authors explain that although the study of human 
behavioral genetics may elucidate the genetic and environmental factors driving 
behavioral differences among individuals in a population, it cannot explain the 
causes of behavior in any specific individual or any specific act by an individual. 
Jonathan Kaplan’s article, Misinformation, Misrepresentation, and Misuse of 
Human Behavioral Genetics Research, offers a more skeptical approach to the 
results of the vast array of scientific studies attempting to decipher the 
relationships among genes, behavior, and development.2  He discusses the 
limitations of human behavioral genetics studies, highlighting the research 
limitations inherent in studying humans and the narrow policy and legal 
applicability of results arising from studying variation in human behavior.  His 
article provides an important cautionary message regarding mis- or over-
interpretation of research results from behavioral genetics studies.  He 
concludes that, from a scientific perspective, behavioral genetics provides little 
relevant information regarding defendants in the criminal justice system. 
The article by Owen D. Jones, and the one by Brent Garland and Mark S. 
Frankel then place behavioral genetics research into a broader scientific, legal, 
and policy context.  Jones’s article, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 
situates the discussion of behavioral genetics by grounding it within broader 
areas of the law and other fields of behavioral biology.3  He explains the 
relationship between behavioral genetics and other disciplines in behavioral 
biology, highlighting how the discussions and conclusions in this volume fit 
within the broader debate.  He also aptly notes that the criminal law is but one 
of many fields of law potentially affected by behavioral genetics.  He compares 
the potential contributions of behavioral genetics and behavioral ecology and 
suggests how the diverging efforts could be joined.  He then offers a foundation 
for the rest of the articles in the volume by introducing principles that have 
gained consensus among scientists and commentators, including a recognition 
of the complexity of behavior, the rejection of genetic determinism, and the 
critically important agreement that the science of behavioral genetics and its 
introduction into the criminal law does not implicate or justify Social 
Spencerism or eugenics.  Finally, Jones notes that genetic factors that contribute 
to behavioral differences in a population could be treated the same as 
environmental factors, despite the incongruity in how each is currently received. 
In Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About Behavioral Genetics, 
Neuroscience, and Law, Brent Garland and Mark S. Frankel emphasize the 
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timeliness of this volume by calling for scientists, lawyers, courts, and 
lawmakers to begin the critical dialogue about the implications of scientific 
discoveries and technological advances on the criminal law.4  They also stress 
the need to discuss the behavioral sciences now, before their use in the criminal 
justice system becomes unchecked.  Garland and Frankel contribute the 
perspective of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) and put the issues discussed in this volume into the context of public 
policy dialogues about both behavioral genetics and the neurosciences.  Their 
article demonstrates the natural parallels between neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics and explains their predictions for the broad ways in which such 
evidence may be used in the criminal law:  in mitigation of criminal 
responsibility for defendants addicted to drugs and alcohol, and in “preformal” 
situations, that is, those occurring before criminal charges are filed.  Through 
their discussion of the shared history of neuroscience and behavioral genetics, 
the actual and potential use of these disciplines, and the differences between the 
two fields, Garland and Frankel provide a powerful and compelling case for the 
urgency of addressing the implications of behavioral sciences in the criminal 
law. 
Building upon this foundation, the following articles in the volume focus on 
particular issues arising from the study of behavioral genetics and the criminal 
law.  The article I co-authored with James E. Coleman Jr. and the one by 
Stephen J. Morse opine that irrespective of its scientific utility, behavioral 
genetics has little relevance to the concept of criminal responsibility.  In 
Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the Criminal from the Crime, Coleman 
and I discuss the attempted use of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal 
cases, and why, as a matter of criminal responsibility theory, such evidence has 
and should have a limited evidentiary role.5  Our discussion focuses first on 
claims advanced by defendants using behavioral genetics evidence, including 
attempts to introduce genetic predispositions to negate the voluntary act 
requirement or mens rea, to satisfy the requirement of mental disease or defect 
for insanity defenses, and as mitigation during sentencing.  We then explain that 
in spite of its potential scientific utility, behavioral genetics has limited 
applicability to criminal responsibility as a matter of criminal law theory.  In so 
doing, we explain the meaning and characteristics of the concepts underlying 
criminal responsibility, with a detailed consideration of the components of 
criminal liability and the operation of the reasonable person standard in 
justifications and excuses to negate criminal liability.  Using behavioral genetics 
as a tool, we offer a coherent approach to understanding criminal responsibility 
and its limiting characteristics, and demonstrate why behavioral genetics 
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evidence should thereby be rejected under the current understanding of 
criminal responsibility. 
Stephen J. Morse’s article, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 
focuses more specifically on drug and alcohol addiction, with a similar 
conclusion about the limited relevance of behavioral genetics evidence to 
criminal responsibility.6  In light of the abundance of studies focusing on the 
genetic contributions to addiction, Morse develops a meaningful background on 
the legal and scientific images of behavior, the disease concept of addiction, and 
the aspects of addiction for which a person may be held legally accountable.  
His article is essential reading for those seeking to understand the implications 
of behavioral genetics research regarding compulsive behavior.  He explains the 
features of addiction that may be relevant to excuses in the criminal law, 
whether addicts are responsible for their own addiction and why new evidence 
regarding biological contributions to compulsion and craving do not negate a 
defendant’s accountability in the criminal law.  Morse makes an important 
contribution to the continuing dialogue about addiction by introducing several 
policy proposals for how such evidence could be used to reduce addiction and 
its resulting criminal behavior. 
With Deborah W. Denno’s Revisiting the Legal Link Between Genetics and 
Crime, the volume shifts to explore some of the additional legal and social 
issues that arise from the study of behavioral genetics and its introduction into 
the criminal justice system.  Denno provides an invaluable update to her earlier 
work detailing the potential implications arising from the high-profile case of 
Stephen Mobley, who sought to introduce a then-cutting-edge theory that 
violence could be based on a genetic or neurochemical abnormality as 
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing.7  Denno discusses the original 
controversy concerning the use of genetic evidence at the time of Mobley’s trial, 
including such concerns as the potential abuse of such information, its 
relationship with concepts of free will, the impact of such information on jurors, 
and the potential stigma associated with genetic predispositions.  She then 
reevaluates those concerns in light of the significant scientific progress that has 
been made in the field since Mobley.  The review of cases in her article affords a 
complementary perspective to the cases that Coleman and I discuss by looking 
at the procedural posture of the cases when such information was introduced 
and the procedural hurdles leading to rejection of such evidence by the courts.  
Based on her review, she explains that in spite of her earlier predictions, the 
role of behavioral genetics in the criminal law still remains largely theoretical 
and has yet to gain widespread acceptance.   
The next several articles address the implications and limitations of ongoing 
behavioral genetics research.  David H. Kaye offers a comprehensive discussion 
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of DNA databanks and the potential use of such databanks for behavioral 
genetics research in his article, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal 
DNA Databases.8  He addresses the concern that DNA databanks serve as a 
limitless repository for future research and that the samples used in the 
databanks could be used for research into a “crime gene.”  Kaye provides a 
compelling explanation of why, given the nature of the samples used in DNA 
databanks and the difficulties and limitations of behavioral genetics studies, the 
search for a “crime gene” is unlikely by scientists.  Nonetheless, he agrees that 
the concerns about the limitless use of these samples cannot be so easily 
dismissed.  He provides a thorough review of state and federal DNA databank 
legislation and explains that although such legislation likely prohibits “crime 
gene” investigations, greater protections for privacy are needed to ensure that 
future amendments do not override such protections.  Finally, he addresses 
some of the bioethical and social arguments against “crime gene” research using 
samples stored in DNA repositories, particularly given the involuntary 
contribution of many such samples and the ethics of retaining these samples at 
all.  He significantly advances the policy debate on this issue by proposing 
mechanisms for guarding against unauthorized use of DNA repositories. 
Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill then consider the unfortunate 
probability that behavioral genetics evidence will be misused to substantiate 
predictions of future dangerousness in their article, Genetic Predictions of 
Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?9  They discuss the 
problems with using actuarial instruments to refine the accuracy of future 
dangerousness predictions, which are employed in contexts including death 
penalty proceedings, sex offender registrations, and post-sentence 
commitments.  Beecher-Monas and Garcia-Rill explain in significant detail the 
scientific reality of behavioral genetics evidence, including a step-by-step 
account of the complex interaction between genes, proteins, nerve cells, 
biochemical and neurochemical pathways, and the environment, which combine 
to give rise to human behavior.  Their detailed account affords a critical 
understanding of the amount and complexity of information necessary for 
behavioral genetics to offer any insight into predictions of future 
dangerousness.  Their discussion makes apparent that in its present state, 
behavioral genetics research cannot improve predictions of future 
dangerousness, and only with significant further scientific progress might such 
information have relevance. 
Finally, Karen Rothenberg and Alice Wang’s article, The Scarlet Gene: 
Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and Ethnic Stigma, is a powerful 
discussion of the broader social implications of researching traits of interest to 
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the criminal law.10  The article is framed by the PBS television program Genes 
on Trial: Genetics, Behavior, and the Law, in which participants discussed the 
situation of the fictitious Tracy Islanders, an ethnic group with a higher 
incidence of alcoholism, attributable in part to the increased incidence of a 
particular gene variant in the population.  The article considers the social 
impact for those who participate in behavioral genetics studies, particularly 
when such research focuses on behaviors related to conduct such as addiction.  
Rothenberg and Wang explain that such studies often focus on discrete and 
insular ethnic groups because of their relatively homogeneous gene pools.  Such 
groups may suffer stigmatization if particular genetic variations are discovered 
that contribute to behavioral variations in that population.  The article 
considers the potential for genetic reductionism and determinism, which would 
shift the focus away from other contributions to violence (including 
environmental and societal ones) and instead narrowly address the genetic 
contributions of behavioral differences.  Rothenberg and Wang’s article 
addresses whether certain types of research should be conducted at all, as well 
as the ethical and social concerns that arise from both the study of behavioral 
genetics as it relates to criminal behavior and the introduction of that 
information into criminal cases. 
In sum, this symposium affords an in-depth background and analysis of 
critical issues arising from behavioral genetics research and its use in the 
criminal justice system.  Although the use of behavioral genetics evidence in 
criminal cases has been relatively limited, one commentator recently noted: 
We stand, in all likelihood, at the threshold of an era in which we will see progressive 
growth in our knowledge of the genetic bases of behavior.  Genes that alone or in 
combination with environmental influences put persons at high risk of violence and 
other crimes will be identified.  Faced with that prospect, it would behoove us to think 
through now how we believe our criminal justice system should be responding to the 
inevitable dilemmas that will arise.11 
Together, these articles represent an important effort to address the “inevitable 
dilemmas that will arise” from the introduction of behavioral genetics, and 
behavioral biology more generally, into the criminal law. 
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